Cloud Infiltration: How a Fake IT Call Hands Attackers the Keys to Azure
Nobody picked a lock here. Someone phoned an employee, said "IT help desk, your passkey needs updating", and the employee opened the door.
This is a plain-English rewrite of what Microsoft's security team published about a cloud break-in campaign, as reported by The Hacker News on September 13, 2026. The accounts at stake are Microsoft cloud identities: Microsoft Entra ID sign-ins, the identity layer behind both Azure and Microsoft 365. If you run either, or just carry a work phone, it is worth five minutes.
The short version
Attackers phone or text employees on their personal phones, pretend to be IT (voice phishing), and talk them into "updating" a passkey or MFA on a fake Microsoft sign-in page. Once inside, they add their own second factor so they can return whenever they like. Then they quietly download everything the account can reach: files, mailboxes, the company directory.
Microsoft has seen this since May 2026.
Think of it as a building
- Your Microsoft 365 account is an office in a big building.
- Passwords and MFA are the lock.
- The attacker does not pick it. They ring the tenant pretending to be maintenance and ask for the key.
- Then they cut a copy (their own MFA device) so they never have to ask again.
- Then they walk the halls (the Graph API), photocopy the cabinets (SharePoint, OneDrive, mail), and leave by a different door every time (rotating IP addresses).
The attack, step by step
- Research. They study the company from public sources like LinkedIn: who works where, who reports to whom.
- The call. A call or text to the employee's personal phone: "IT here, update your passkey, MFA or SSO now or lose access." A personal phone sits outside most company filters, which is likely why they use it.
- The fake sign-in page. The text links to a page that looks like Microsoft's. Two tricks are in play:
- Adversary-in-the-middle: the fake page relays your login to the real one in real time and captures it.
- Device code: you are walked through entering a code that quietly gives the attacker access. No password or cookie is stolen, and MFA never gets in the way, because you approved it yourself.
- Plant a second key. They enrol an MFA method they control: a new phone number, authenticator app or software token (modify authentication process: MFA, device registration). Now they can sign in without you, and keep doing so while your credentials or sessions stay valid.
- Walk the halls. Through the Microsoft Graph API, the same API legitimate apps use, they list users, groups, permissions and resources, and look at roles and high-value accounts for ways to climb higher.
- Take everything. High-volume downloads from SharePoint Online and OneDrive (data from cloud storage), mailbox contents (email collection), sometimes Exchange Online. It can run from hours to several days.
- Cover the tracks. Separate IP addresses for sign-in, recon and exfiltration, so one blocked address never connects the story.
A variant skips the call: they reuse credentials stolen in an earlier breach and simply register their own phone as an MFA method.
Why it is hard to catch
- MFA was on, and it did not help. You handed over the key, or the attacker's own factor got registered.
- Each Graph API call looks ordinary. Microsoft's warning: Graph abuse rarely looks suspicious through a single API call. The signal is the sequence.
The sequence is: odd sign-in, then a new MFA method, then a directory listing, then mass downloads. Any one of those alone can pass for a normal day.
The other campaign: same trick, different goal
In a separate run on August 3-5, 2026, attackers sent over a million emails posing as CEOs. They asked accounts-payable teams to wire ACH payments for a fake ServiceNow subscription (ServiceNow itself was not involved), backed by invented invoices, forged email threads and real executives' names in the signatures. The writing was AI-assisted, and the targets were US companies in IT services, consumer goods, real estate and manufacturing. Two of the fake domains: service-nowinc[.]com and domainlify[.]net.
That one steals money. The cloud campaign steals data. Both run on the same ingredient: a convincing story from a trusted-looking sender.
Who is behind it
Microsoft ties the initial access to several crews. Storm-3121 does the initial break-in that leads to ShinyHunters and Falcon extortion. Storm-3032, Microsoft's name for UNC6671, split from the BlackFile group and now works under the Helix extortion brand. The playbook overlaps with groups tracked as Cordial Spider, O-UNC-045 and PREY-0058.
The exact links between them are unclear. The likely story is shared playbooks and the same off-the-shelf phishing kits.
Their fake domains follow one pattern: the target's company name as a subdomain of a passkey-themed domain, so the link looks personal. Mandiant noted the same thing for UNC6671: credential-harvesting pages on generic passkey-themed root domains, with victim-specific subdomains for targeted voice phishing. Microsoft's examples of the root domains:
passkeyhelpdesk[.]com secure-passkey[.]com
setupmypasskey[.]com add-passkey[.]com
integratedsso[.]com oktasession[.]com
syncmykey[.]com portalsetuphub[.]com
The [.] is on purpose, so nobody clicks by accident.
What to do about it
For everyone
- IT will not text your personal phone to "update your passkey". Hang up and call the help-desk number from your intranet.
- Never type a code from a text or call into a Microsoft page (device code phishing).
- Reached a sign-in page from a text message? Close it. Type the address yourself.
For admins (my takeaways; Microsoft's own advice includes the device-code and phishing-resistant MFA points)
- Alert on every new MFA method registration (MITRE T1556.006), especially a phone number or authenticator app right after a sign-in from somewhere new.
- Block device-code sign-in with Conditional Access if nobody needs it.
- Prefer phishing-resistant MFA like passkeys and security keys: they are tied to the real site, so a look-alike page cannot replay them.
- Watch bulk SharePoint and OneDrive downloads, especially from unmanaged devices, and correlate Graph API activity across events instead of call by call.
- After an incident, remove unknown MFA methods and revoke sessions. A password reset alone does not evict them.
The whole post in four lines
- Attackers phone staff, pose as IT, and walk them through a fake passkey or MFA update.
- They add their own second factor, so a password reset alone does not kick them out.
- Then they quietly read and download files and mail through the Graph API, from rotating IPs.
- Catch the sequence, not the single event, and teach people that IT never texts a passkey link.
The mental model that stuck: the attacker's goal is not your password. It is a key they control.
Written in my own words; indicators are defanged.
References
The campaign
- Microsoft Security Blog, Sep 9, 2026: Passkey-themed social engineering leads to identity and cloud compromise
- Microsoft Security Blog, Sep 10, 2026: AI-assisted executive impersonation and invoice fraud (the CEO and ServiceNow campaign)
- The Hacker News, Sep 13, 2026: Attackers Use Passkey Phishing to Hijack Microsoft Cloud Accounts and Exfiltrate Data
- BleepingComputer: Passkey-themed phishing attacks lead to Microsoft 365 data theft
The crews
- Google Cloud / Mandiant, Aug 2026: UNC6671 Rebrands: Multi-Brand Vishing Extortion Targets Financial Services and Enterprise Cloud Environments
- The Hacker News, Aug 2026: UNC6671 Vishing Attacks Target Personal Phones to Steal SaaS Data
- The Hacker News, Jan 2026: Mandiant Finds ShinyHunters-Style Vishing Attacks Stealing MFA to Breach SaaS Platforms
Background
- Microsoft Security Blog, Jul 12, 2022: From cookie theft to BEC: Attackers use AiTM phishing sites as entry point to further financial fraud
Microsoft documentation
- What is Microsoft Entra?
- Microsoft Graph overview
- OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant
- Block authentication flows with Conditional Access policy
- Conditional Access authentication strengths (phishing-resistant MFA)
MITRE ATT&CK